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The question of the possible impact of the discoveries made in genetics on the concept of 
being human has been explored by a number of humanities scholars and social theorists 
(Habermas 2003, Derrida 2002, Baudrillard 2000, Fukuyama 2002), who have expressed 
concern about the science of genetics and technologies arising out of it providing a 
biological reductionist definition of the human or forcing societies to accept a fixed 
definition of the human in their legislation. Anthropologists and social scientists have 
argued that genetic technology is causing a change in the way we conceptualise ourselves 
and essentialise our identity (Franklin 1993, Lippman 1993, Brodwin 2002). It has been 
also observed that the Human Genome Project (HGP) was portrayed both in scientific 
and popular literature as a solution to the mysteries of life itself (Haraway 1997, 
Holmberg 2005). But is this view shared by the primary providers of the knowledge of 
genetics and genomics, i.e. relevant scientists themselves?   Various terms and concepts 
emanating from life sciences appear to have taken on a life of their own in the public 
discourse as reflected in the surveys of public opinion, mass media, literature, film and 
even visual art (Nelkin and Lindee 2004, Van Dijck 1998). Do scientists   have any fixed 
views of the cultural meanings of genetics?        
The mass media and popular scientific literature often create an impression of 
scientists directing public opinion towards a reductionist understanding of the 
implications of life sciences for the concepts of being human (Nelkin and Lindee 2004).  
Some distinguished molecular biologists themselves have contributed considerably to this 
image. Thus James Watson has mentioned that Francis Crick was right when he 
announced in the Eagle pub that they had discovered the ‘secret of life’(Watson 2003: 
xix) (though the latter argued in his autobiography that he did not remember it (Crick 
1988: 77)).   In the same book Watson observes that the Human Genome Project was not 
just ‘an extraordinary technological achievement’, but also ‘a landmark in terms of our 
idea of what it is to be human’, as, according to him, ‘it is our DNA that distinguishes us 
from all other species, and that makes us creative, conscious, dominant, destructive 
creatures that we are’ (Watson 2003: xxi-xxii). Another distinguished molecular biologist 
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and a Nobel laureate Walter Gilbert suggested that the HGP will cause significant 
changes in human self-perception: ‘To recognize that we are determined, in a certain 
sense, by a finite collection of information that is knowable will change our view of 
ourselves. It is a closing of an intellectual frontier, with which we will have to come to 
terms’ (Gilbert 2000: 96). How wide-spread are such claims which may be   interpreted 
as reductionist among geneticists and molecular biologists?  Does everybody in this 
profession ascribe their branch of science this very special meaning?    
This paper explores the responses of scientists from the UK, Russia, France and 
the USA to questions about the cultural and conceptual implications of genetics. It is 
based on eighteen semi-structured in-depth interviews which were conducted from 
December 2004 to May 2005 and in March 2006. All interviewees are senior scientists 
working at well-established departments/schools/institutes of genetics or molecular 
biology. Half of them are scientists involved in basic research and university teaching and 
the other half are medical geneticists involved both in basic research and clinical practice.   
The interviewees were asked a number of questions inviting them to reflect on 
the conceptual implications that genetics had had or might have on general culture. The 
interview included the following questions: Would you say that discoveries made in 
genetics   since Mendel have affected the concept of being human (at least in ‘Western’ 
culture) and, if yes, how? Have they in any way affected ‘our’ worldviews? Why do you 
think we hear so much about genetics in the mass media? Is there anything special about 
genetics in terms of the way people relate to it as opposed to other natural sciences, 
including other life sciences?   
The received answers were rather diverse. Many of them distinguished between 
the implications of the science of genetics per se and of the technology stemming from it. 
As far as the former is concerned  most of the interviewees mentioned genetics 
demonstrating that there was a lot in our nature that was beyond our control and several 
scientists specified that the real conceptual revolution was brought by Mendel whose 
work cast light on the mechanisms of heredity, a question which  had always been 
extremely important in many societies. As one interviewee put it, ‘inheritance is a very 
powerful part of any individual’s own view of themselves’ and hence people tended to 
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find the idea that by looking at their DNA it was possible to make some predictions about 
their future both attractive and frightening.     
At the same time, practically each person qualified his or her response in such a 
way so that to avoid sounding too deterministic. One interviewee argued that though the 
cultural importance of the knowledge of inheritance that genetics gave the world was 
impossible to overestimate because heredity was one of the most fundamental concepts 
pertinent to the understanding of what it means to be human, geneticists were ‘moving 
away from being deterministic’ as the importance of epigenetic factors was becoming 
more and more apparent particularly after the completion of the HGP. She also argued 
that sometimes geneticists themselves were guilty of playing up the social importance of 
genetics in front of the public for fund-raising purposes. Another person said that it was 
obvious that some features were predetermined and hence it was important to develop 
genetic engineering to correct the ‘mistakes of nature’, but it had to be confined to purely 
therapeutic purposes and combined with changes in environment whose influence was at 
least as important as that of the genes. Another scientist also observed that genetics was 
not as highly predictive as people used to think. Only one respondent observed without 
hesitation that ‘genetics is very much about a person’s identity; along with those parts of 
their identity, which a person cannot alter as easily as they wish by external factors’.  
Every interviewee was asked to compare the conceptual impact of genetics to 
that of the Darwinian revolution. Everyone argued that the former was hardly as 
important as the latter because the findings of genetics just concretised and further 
developed Darwin’s findings. In the words of one respondent ‘the theory of evolution 
offered some totally new knowledge, while with genetics, we always knew that there was 
a mechanism that allows us to pass our qualities onto our children, and genetics just 
helped us to work out what exactly this mechanism was.’  Some interviewed scientists 
noted that one of the most important cultural implications of genetics was that it was 
helping to reconstruct the history of human migrations though this research was not very 
well known either among historians or among the general public.  
A number of respondents linked genetics and religion. One of them was a 
practising Christian who said that his work confirmed to him the idea of intelligent 
design. As he put it,  it was difficult to imagine how biological processes worked without 
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it. Others mentioned that though they themselves were secular and did not believe in God 
they could see how discoveries made in molecular biology could be interpreted as 
supporting the idea of intelligent design. They also cited cases of people they knew 
becoming religious after they started studying molecular biology.  
Several medical geneticists stressed that there was no such thing as one 
‘universal’ conceptual impact of genetics and that people from different cultures were 
bound to give genetic findings different interpretations. One person who had patients 
from a variety of ethnic groups said that from her experience people from different 
backgrounds could have a wide range of views of DNA studies and  that a good 
knowledge of different religious cultures was essential for an adequate practice of   
medical genetics. Another practitioner observed that one of the things that she liked most 
about working in genetics was that this was a science which had an interaction with 
philosophy but she also felt uncomfortable about giving any definitive answers about the 
impact of genetics on human self-perception:  
 
Has it [genetics] changed the way we see ourselves? It is a huge question. It has 
to have done… It makes in some ways you feel less in control of what you are 
as individual because genetics shows that there are control issues which are 
beyond yourself … On the other hand I think it has no effect at all and it 
depends on the culture from which you come… So I don’t think that I know the 
answer …that is the bottom line.  
   
She added that her job had taught her to be understanding of a variety of interpretations 
of scientific research and its application no matter how different they were from hers as 
she had to deal with a very diverse community of patients. When I asked her whether 
most of her colleagues felt this way she said that there were more scientists interested in 
what genetics meant to mankind among medical geneticists who worked in the clinic than 
among those who never had to leave the lab though there was a big spectrum among them 
too.   
Some geneticists involved just in basic research were not keen on making any 
sweeping generalisations about the conceptual implications of genetics either. When I 
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asked one scientist what in his view the impact of genetics on worldviews was he was 
rather surprised at the question:  
 
Whose worldviews are you talking about? There are all sorts of worldviews out 
there just like there are many religions. So, we can only talk about whether 
genetics has influenced Christian worldview or Muslim worldview or Hindu 
worldview… It is difficult for me to judge… I think I can only talk about 
whether genetics has influenced the philosophy of science. I think it definitely 
has. But then there are so many philosophies… Materialist, idealist 
philosophies… Which philosophy are we talking about? I am not a philosopher, 
so it is difficult for me to say. I think that genetics has definitely influenced 
science… Has it had any conceptual implications for physics? I think I can only 
say that it had conceptual implications for biology.  
 
Some respondents not only refrained from commenting ‘too much’ on the 
cultural implications of genetics but even stated that scientists were the wrong people to 
ask. Thus one interviewee  argued that scientists could only make cognitive claims 
regarding the object of their study and should not interfere in the subject matter of, for 
instance, historians, ‘Scientists have got the best methodology available for the study of 
their subject matter and, similarly, historians, have the best methodology available for the 
study of history.’ Another respondent stressed that some people could be excellent 
scientists in the sense that they would be producing very rigorous research and at the 
same time be biased and irrational when asked about issues outside of their area of 
expertise. He even observed with regret that distinguished scientists, Nobel prize winners, 
for example, were often asked to comment on social and cultural issues though they had 
nothing valuable to say. 
At the same time, several respondents stressed that the developments which 
occurred in genetics after Mendel and Morgan, from the discovery that the hereditary 
material was in DNA to the completion of the Human Genome Project, hardly had any 
broader conceptual implications for society whatsoever. They argued that these were just 
technological advances which had a colossal impact on medicine, various social policies 
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and practices but had nothing to offer philosophy. Other respondents observed that 
reproductive technologies stemming from  molecular biology and the possibility of 
genetic engineering on human beings did generate a lot of discussion in the public 
domain about biosciences redefining the concept of being human, however, they stressed 
that these ‘implications’ existed mainly in people’s minds and were a matter of politics 
and not of science. Two respondents even argued that as far as genetic engineering was 
concerned scientists were not doing anything ‘revolutionary’, anything that could not 
have happened ‘in nature’ anyway.  One scientist, who was also very critical of the public 
perceptions of genetic engineering, said that she was amused at how much importance 
people were ascribing to ‘human’ DNA without appreciating the fact that it was ‘the 
same DNA as in other species’. In her experience, lay people tended to think that human 
DNA was bound to be special and experimenting with it was sacrilege.      
Other respondents did not dismiss the importance of the cultural implications of 
genetic engineering and other technologies associated with genetic research, particularly 
those resulting in reproductive technologies, however stressed that though such 
technological advances were likely to affect the debate about what it means to be human, 
this debate was bound to be divorced from the actual science, with different participants 
in the debate making of scientific facts whatever they wished. Though they themselves 
would prefer not to take up any particular position on the question and argued that it is up 
to the general public, humanities scholars, social scientists and policy makers to ascribe 
particular meanings to genetics and to construe its conceptual implications, they were 
wary of the possibility of misusing science. This is how one of the interviewed scientists 
illustrated his feelings about it:  
   
One of these earliest debates [about the implications of biotechnology] centered 
very largely on the question of whether a fertilized egg less than 14 days old  
began to transcribe its own RNA from its own genes. The argument that was 
being made was that as long as maternal RNA is being used to make the  
proteins of  which this thing is growing, you could not regard it as an 
independent being but that independence came with the initiation of RNA 
transcription. The idea that someone could seriously put forward the idea that 
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you could define the person on the basis of RNA prescription struck me as 
pretty bizarre, really, pretty bizarre!  
 
Almost every interviewee expressed concern about lay people misinterpreting 
science. The same respondent who observed that scientists were not always the best 
people to advise on social issues, was at the same time rather critical of the attempts of 
some commentators coming from outside of science to give scientific facts various 
cultural meanings to support their social assumptions:  
 
People could always find what appeared to be very good arguments from sex 
chromosomes related things, as to why this supported the assumed correctness 
that women were inferior in most things. In recent years the actual observations, 
particularly education, have changed, and now you look in the newspapers and 
people are worried about why are boys doing much worse than girls. You could 
then start to bring out exactly the same apparently but not scientifically based 
arguments in terms of the sex chromosomes that we used to support the opposite 
thirty years ago. Now people look at why boys are doing much worse, and 
obviously you got one X chromosome, all these genes for intelligence are on X 
chromosomes, the woman has two.         
 
One geneticist admitted that when invited to conferences devoted to the social 
implications of genetics he would often accept the invitation just to correct the 
misconceptions that the speakers might reveal. Two respondents were very appreciative 
of the importance of the disciplines of the history and philosophy of science provided it 
was done by people who ‘knew their science’ and preferably were scientists themselves. 
Other respondents did not demand of science studies scholars formal training in science 
but argued that they should work in collaboration with scientists. The geneticists I 
interviewed in Russia were particularly wary of the danger of subjecting science to an 
ideological agenda referring to the tragic history of genetics in the Soviet Union.  
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Many respondents expressed a very strong commitment to bringing benefit to 
society and some were convinced that to be able to do this scientists had to be aware of 
humanitarian issues that may stand behind their research. One respondent observed that 
like all scientists geneticists were driven by a desire to know how a particular part of the 
world worked, but unlike, say, astronomers  all biologists realised that their research had 
a lot of potential to bring people direct benefit. Another geneticist suggested that because 
science had lots of practical applications the definition of the goals of scientific research 
largely depended on society:  
 
 I think most scientists I know want to make an impact, they want to do 
something important and make an impact on that generally for the good of the 
world. So I cannot see how broad based understanding of the humanities, 
culture, and history would not be useful for each of us forming our judgment as 
to what is important. 
 
At the same time when it came to interpreting the conceptual implications of science he 
felt that if the task was to be delegated to non-scientists at all it could only be the 
philosophers of science who were well acquainted with the subject matter.   
 
So does genetics impact philosophy? I think at the highest levels philosophy is a 
great discipline where the best practitioners are deeply schooled in the 
principles of science that relates to their work. It seems to me though that the 
general public’s use of the philosophy when describing scientific issues is 
largely ignorant of any of the underlying science. I think this must be great 
source of frustration to the philosophers as it is to the scientists.      
 
Finally, when asked about what is so special about genetics and why they think 
it figures so prominently in the public discourse, many respondents argued that it was 
again due a lack of knowledge of the subject among non-specialists. Most interviewees 
agreed that it was not surprising that life sciences were popular and often made 
newspaper headlines because it was a vibrant area of research which was promising 
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significant advances in health care. However, they all stressed that these days the 
boundaries between genetics and other life sciences such as biochemistry, molecular 
biology, embryology, etc. were very fluid, there were numerous cross-overs between 
them and ‘genetics’ had a special status mainly in public imagination with people calling 
‘genetics’ everything related to biotechnology including stem cell research, IVF 
treatment, pre-natal diagnostics, cloning and GM food. The reason for that quoted by 
several respondents was that the word genetics, unlike biochemistry and molecular 
biology, had a solid historical baggage of meaning for lay people. 
Some respondents were particularly concerned with what one of them called 
‘poor PR’ that genetics had because of its association with eugenics. Many were not 
happy with the way genetics was portrayed in the mass media which in their view 
stressed either the worst possible outcomes of genetic research or described genetics as a 
solution to all problems. In both cases, according to my respondents, the press tended to 
be far too deterministic about the role of inheritance. At the same time two interviewees 
suggested that often scientists themselves were guilty both of promoting genetics as a 
special high powered science and of taking advantage of genetics being fashionable by 
using the word unnecessarily when setting up research projects and applying for funding.      
 
Conclusion 
 
It appears that on the whole my respondents were very open to discussion 
involving multiple interpretations of the cultural significance of their work and were 
generally happy to engage with philosophical issues. I would suggest that when talking 
about their own understandings of the conceptual implications of genetics the 
interviewees  revealed a wide range of approaches, which  were present in the answers of 
scientists from each  country where interviews were conducted.  As shown above, some 
of them argued that the current state of research in molecular biology does not go against 
the idea of intelligent design. Some suggested that it could support a variety of 
interpretations.  Others revealed a covert suspicion of conceptual analyses of most 
genetic discoveries and were confident to express their views on the implications of 
genetics’ achievements for the concept of being human only in those cases where these 
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implications were very clear and almost universally recognised (i.e. that our physicality 
was at least partly predetermined genetically and that the nature of inheritance was 
particulate). Though on the face of it these respondents were happy to let humanities 
scholars, social scientists and general public to ‘get on’ with philosophising about 
genetics they were also distinguishing between the ‘real’ and the ‘imaginary’ 
philosophical implications of genetics. The ‘real’ ones in their view are the implications 
which are based on scientific facts and have a clear meaning. The imaginary are those 
which represent just some of the numerous possible conflicting interpretations of these 
facts. As it was observed in one of the interviews quoted above, the suggestion that DNA 
coded for RNA and RNA coded for protein did not necessarily provide any obvious 
insights into what it means to be a separate organism, leave alone into what it means to be 
human.  
I suggest that these responses are characterised by a tension between the view 
that scientists and society should avoid giving scientific discoveries too much 
philosophical meaning and focus on scientific research satisfying people’s ‘material’ 
rather than ‘cultural’ needs and promoting a very specific, often reductionist 
understanding of the philosophical implications of genetics.  In other words, under the 
pretext of refraining from ascribing genetic advances any meaning at all they actually 
argued that what these advances meant was that molecular biology had demystified the 
concept of human physicality.  
At the same time most respondents, regardless of their own views of the 
question, were happy to recognise that different social and cultural communities may 
have different interpretations of the discoveries made in genetics. Nobody claimed that 
scientists had a monopoly on the knowledge of what it means to be human and many 
demonstrated a stronger commitment to the idea of discovering how the material world 
works rather than to solving ‘the mysteries of life’. However,  practically all respondents 
were concerned about non-specialists misrepresenting science in their discussions of the 
cultural meanings of genetics. Thus I would suggest that my interviewees were shifting 
between recognising that multiple interpretations of the philosophical implications of 
their work were possible and that scientists were not the only and sometimes not even the 
best candidates for the job of discerning philosophical significance of their research on 
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the one hand and an urge to make sure that these interpretations were based on ‘correct 
science’ on the other.  
It should be noted in this respect that in the interviews the respondents were 
asked also about their view of the impact of culture and society on science. Their answers 
to these questions were much more homogenous, as every person argued that culture 
could hardly affect scientific methodology.
1
 When answering questions about the 
conceptual implications of genetics most respondents also stressed that once the ‘concrete 
scientific facts’ had been established they might be ascribed a variety of cultural 
meanings. However, what was important is to make sure that any prior cultural 
presuppositions does not affect the processing of establishing these facts.     
To conclude, it appears that there is a lot of interest among molecular biologists 
and geneticists in establishing a dialogue with humanities scholars and the general public 
where scientists would be correcting various misrepresentations of scientific facts. At the 
same time as far as the interpretation of the conceptual implications of genetics is 
concerned there is hardly any ground for talking about a dichotomy between ‘scientific’ 
and ‘non-scientific’ views. Not every scientist would sign up to James Watson’s 
perceptions of the meaning of genetics and, as was shown, the views that interviewed 
scientists had on the subject, were sometimes diametrically opposite.  
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